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3Embodying the Chimera: Biotechnology and
Subjectivity
Bernard Andrieu
‘‘Chacun d’eux portait sur son dos une e´norme Chime`re’’ [Each one of them carried on
his back an enormous Chimera]
—Baudelaire, Le Spleen de Paris, bk. VI
Until the end of the seventeenth century, the monstrous body had a mythological func-
tion: A sign from irate gods, the monster (Kapler 1980) is not malformed like Oedipus’s
twisted foot/fate, it is a prodigious creature whose corporeal formation endows it with
superior power. However, one must differentiate between fabulous monsters, whose corpo-
real hybridization remains paradoxical, and biological monsters studied as early as Hippo-
crates in Of Generation, X-I, and Aristotle in Of the Generation of Animals, Book IV. Greek
mythology includes fabulous monsters, human bodies that have been recomposed with an-
imal attributes such as wings, serpents, and boar tusks for Steno and Euryale (transformed
by Athena owing to Medusa’s jealousy), and Medusa, lover of Poseidon and expecting his
child also transformed by Athena). Losing or disfiguring its human body defines the fab-
ulous monster as a fall. On the other hand, the chimera is born with a triple animal body,
a sort of multiform and polycephalous beast uniting multiple forms in one body (Plato,
The Republic, bk. IX): lion-headed and dragon-tailed on the body of a goat. Yet specific
unity is not maintained, as in the embodiment of Cerberus, the dog with three heads
and a tail of snakes (figure 3.1). Cerberus remains a dog when a chimera represents three
juxtaposed species. The chimera is a malefic creature whose next of kin are Echidna (half
snake, half nymph), Geryon, the three-bodied giant, Medusa (serpent-haired and stony-
eyed), Scylla (six claws, mouths and heads, and the roar of a lion) as well as the Sphynx
endowed with a maiden’s head and breasts, lion claws, and a dragon tail on a dog’s body.
Bellerophon, queen Stheneboea’s would-be lover, was exposed to her husband as he
spurned her. The king then ordered him to rid the country of Chimera, a fabulous creature
born from the monstrous giant Typhon and the viper-bodied nymph Echidna, and who
was, according to Homer (The Iliad, bk. VI), lion from up front, dragon from the back
and goat in the middle. The breach of the laws of hospitality here rests on the adulterous
desire felt by the queen for Bellerophon who, in her eyes, had the bad taste of refusing her.
The queen was scared by this representation of an object of desire refusing itself to whom
desires it. Bellerophon owes his confrontation to Chimera’s body to this impossible hand-
to-hand combat. All hold his death as certain, but the fabulous creature gives him the
opportunity of an initiatic trial. Bellerophon is the child of Poseidon and the queen of
Ephyra; he owes his name to his murder of Belleros, tyrant of Corynth, which freed the
town. With the help of a gift from the goddess Athena, he manages to tame the winged
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horse Pegasus. Then, zeroing in on the monster, he makes a nosedive: Chimera spews
flames in defense, but Bellerophon seals its mouth with a leaden ball that melts under
the heat, and stifles it to death.
Admittedly, the chimera can be used as a scapegoat as opposed to the unicorn, an em-
blem of purity and virginity in the Middle Ages. Yet the unicorn is a fabulous animal
whose corporeal coherence makes it appealing, the equine body not being too remote
from the deerhead bearing its sole horn. The chimera is a mixture of species—lion, goat,
and dragon, that inverts the natural order by producing a paradoxical being. It is not an
internal metamorphosis of the body, but a complex body. It is not a denigration of the
corporeal form as much as an interrogation, through its presence, of the constitution and
origin of corporeal identity. The chimera is not a hybrid in the sense that a mule is the
hybrid of a donkey and a mare.
In ridding Corynth of Chimera, the mythical body of the semi-god triumphs over the
chimerical body through the mastery of fire. Sexuality lies at the heart of the chimerical
body insofar as Echidna may be Typhon’s sister. The body of the semi-god (armed, it must
be said, by Athena, daughter of Zeus whose limbs were temporarily bound by a trium-
phant Typhon before his destruction by the king of gods) refuses adultery and slays the
incestuous daughter Chimera. Morals end up untainted, but the paradigm is set. As
Franc¸oise Duvignaud stresses: ‘‘The beast always lies close, reminder of a former order.
Witness Typhon, monster amongst monsters, whom Gaia to no avail summons as a final
attempt of mind perversion. Zeus, ever the bright spark, eventually destroys Typhon, but
not before the latter, in a monstrous mating with Echidna, has begotten a progeny that
will become the scourge of the centuries to come: Chimera, the Sphynx, Medusa and
Scylla.’’ (Duvignaud 1981, 21).
By adopting this technique given by Zeus, the sublunar world can hope to hold
sway over the impurity and the malignancy of the chimerical body which cannot last
or reproduce, not only because of its incestuous origin, but also because its make-up is
heterogeneous.
According to the science historian Jean-Louis Fischer, it is as late as ‘‘1830 that Geoff-
roy Saint-Hilaire gives the science of monsters its name of teratology. As an object of
science, the monster becomes an object of comparison, of reflection in the field of embry-
ology as well as in the elaboration of the transformist theories that preceded the theories of
evolution’’ (Fischer 1991, 38). Bellerophon’s victory soon is a prodigy no more; it sets the
study of chimeras at the heart of the technical domination without which a human being
cannot be held as the peer of a God. The chimera is a trial to initiate humans to the dark
side of creation: There is no creation without anomaly, there are no creatures without
monsters, no whole bodies without mixed bodies.
The chimerical body raises the problem of identity. How can one be such a body, at the
same time a lion, a dragon, and a goat? The harpy is part woman and part bird (figure
3.2). A monster is its body flaw, which is to say it sends us back to natural anomalies.
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From Mythical to Scientific Chimera
In science, a chimera is an organism composed of two sorts of cells with different genetic
origins, stemming from two different zygotes. Nature generates some chimeras without
human intervention. Vegetal chimeras are made of interlocking tissues with genetically
different structures, such as the apple tree, the maple, or the sansevieria (an agave-related
species). Human chimeras are the result of chromosomal anomalies: Thus the dizygotic
twin, whose sibling is usually stillborn, is transfused with hematopoietic tissue (bone-
marrow) from the latter, harboring in this way two blood populations from different
groups. The human chimera therefore is not the intermediate body of a Prometheus, a
Faust, or a Frankenstein.
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The imaginary relations that biological sciences have with the nature of the human
body put a cast of evil on the changed body. Science may have sold its soul to the devil
by preferring genetic immortality to the human condition. Unlike the chimera’s body,
metamorphosis does not uphold the double biological way, it only transforms the corpo-
real form, even if the hero’s soul is damned: Prometheus is gnawed by his fault, Faust is
sold to the devil, and Frankenstein is haunted by his origins. The metamorphosis is not
a metanoia, which is to say, a conversion enabling the soul to turn away forever from the
shadows in the cave in order to follow the stages of a dialectic ascending toward Truth.
The changed body, as opposed to the chimerical body, claims to have done away with
otherness whereas it remains inside it to give it identity. Metamorphosis is a failed chi-
mera. The chimera upholds the Same and the Other within a unique double body, for
the chimera is double—not a Doctor Jekyll and Mister Hyde, but a biological being
whose double identity is always identifiable whenever identity alternation is necessary in
the case of a split personality.
Jacqueline Carroy (1993) has illuminated the many historical affinities shared by the
myth of split personality and the science vs. occultism schism that motivated many scien-
tists at the end of the nineteenth century. The biological chimera rests upon what Olivier
Pourquie´ calls, in his presentation of Nicole Le Douarin’s works, a ‘‘substitution of homol-
ogous territories’’ rather than upon the parallelism of complementary identities. The chi-
merical body contains both quail cells and chicken cells; ‘‘the embryo chimera obtained in
this way develops normally and the quail cells that compose the neural tube as well as the
derivatives of the neural ridge that migrate from the neural folds can be identified through
Feulgen-Rosszenbeck’s nuclear coloring’’ (Pourquie´ 1995, 42). Identifying the cells stem-
ming from the transplant can be done regardless of the state of differentiation of the cells.
Fusion is incomplete for the chimera as it maintains the Different within the Same. One
needs to follow the migration of the different within a unit without the latter disappear-
ing: each is telltale of the other.
Yet the model of the chimerical body belongs to a contemporary fantasy, that of devel-
opmental biology. Winkler created the first vegetal chimeras in 1907: These heteroplastic
grafts consisted of the paired cells from two different species without their respective he-
reditary potentials being modified. The chimera can not transmit its somatic state as long
as one does not tinker with germinal cells.
The Chimera’s Transplanted Body
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the scientific model of the chimerical
body showed the transplanted body as the representation of the modern subject. Through
transplants, the subject was able to step into the technical possibility of building a body
while giving it an identity.
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Chimerical biology was born when Mathieu Jaboulay (1860–1913) and Alexis Carrel
(1873–1944) attempted their first grafts, respectively in 1906 and 1908. For any patient
receiving a transplant, there remains the problem of the tolerance of the chimerical body.
In this respect, Christian Cabrol prophesied:
By 2015, it would be good for this tolerance to be obtained in all cases, in the wake
of the transplant, for the receiving organism to accept two sorts of organs, its own
and those transplanted.—But that’s what was formerly called chimerism!—Indeed!
In Ancient Greece the chimera was a fabulous animal showing the characteristics of
different species, e.g., a human torso on a horse’s body for centaurs [figure 3.3]. Un-
derstanding the mechanisms of tolerance would be an undeniable breakthrough on
the way to the complete success of transplants, sparing the host the drawbacks of an
immunodepressing treatment and the liability of chronic rejection leading to the pro-
gressive destruction of the transplant. (Cabrol 1995, 148)
The host must incorporate the Other into his own identity in order to live on. He never
wholly becomes a chimera because of the technological contribution of an organ alien to
the body per se. This technological contribution keeps the transplant within the frame of
the mechanical body. As David Le Breton, the body sociologist, makes it clear: ‘‘When-
ever symbolism deserts the body, there indeed remains of the latter but a set of wheels, a
technical organization of interchangeable functions’’ (Le Breton 1993, 274–275). If this
objectification of the body does have a part in ending the incarnate man of Christianity,
it also points to a new relation of the subject to living matter. The transfiguration of the
body defines a mode of incarnation that is subjective and not metaphysical anymore: Only
the subject now wants to go beyond his body by defining it as a complex network of ele-
ments grafted together.
In biologist and philosopher Michel Tibon-Cornillot’s eyes,
chimerical animals, plants or bacteria herald the engineering of a new biological na-
ture in which one can decipher anew an order of purposes which, in some way, have
replaced the old providential ends that had carefully been expelled from the world.
The emergence of these new beings, transgenics and chimeras, is set within such
violent anthropocentrism that their presence really would not be a problem. (Tibon-
Cornillot 1992, 232)
For all that, these new ‘‘rational-imaginary’’ objects are not virtual objects. They belong
to the biological compatibilities allowed by nature even if not produced by nature itself
along the course of its evolution. Even if chimeras depend mostly on scientific production,
they stem from human understanding of life’s mechanisms.
The legitimacy of this production should not be questioned. Like philosopher Max
Marcuzzi, one can, of course, see ‘‘artificial bodies’’ in these productions, and assert that
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Teratology is biology in its widest form, and ontology in its strictest form; but above
all, the lack of an absolute reference or harmony, whether divine or natural, that could
be held as an objective and constant norm, there is no other norm left but the individ-
ual from which to decide what is or is not an aberration, and thus also to decide what
makes the body, and what form it can have. (Marcuzzi 1996, 176–177)
Chromosomal aberrations and anomalies are, however, an essential dimension of living
matter. The life sciences have always studied these countermodels in order to understand
the reverse effect of nature’s mirror through the two-way mirror of experience and experi-
ment. What makes the chimera topical is not fashion as much as the definition of a new
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world, in which the natural human being’s essence is material to the point of coercing the
body, fitting it with prostheses and grafts.
Transgenic Chimeras and Biopower
The use of biotechnologies feeds the illusion of an uncastrated body, a body within which
we could be both one and the other, masculine and feminine. Patrick Baudry, a sociolo-
gist, understands the yearning to abolish all limitations as a figure of the ‘‘body extreme’’
(Baudry 1991, 1996) in that stepping over these limitations would entail the body’s
disappearance. Yet from the point of view of the life sciences, this extreme relation to
the self accomplishes itself through mutation. Individual use of one’s body resulting
from an ideological conjunction of liberalism and biology empowers the subject of our
time to transform not only the state but also the nature of his body.
To be sure, bioethical laws in several countries do now put a ban on human transgen-
esis because of the immorality of fiddling with our hereditary genetic patrimony, but for
how long? All in vitro interventions should create nothing other than mosaic chimeras in
order to ensure life through a therapeutic modification of the somatic cells with no defin-
itive intervention on the germinal cells. Positive eugenism is thus proscribed, returning
the human transgenic chimera to the position of literary object; yet negative eugenism
does surround us: Anyone will admit that eliminating genetic diseases when selecting
embryos for in vitro fecundation is very convenient to avoid necessitating abortion or hav-
ing to raise a seriously handicapped child. Anomalies are eliminated from the start, thus
recomposing the human chimera through the purification of the quality of its patrimony.
At the beginning of our century, metamorphosis turns into a mode and a fashion of
change of appearance, all too often confused with a change of being. Truism triumphs
but the analogy with the human body remains dominant. By betting on all possibilities
one does loosen the notion of being without asking the fundamental questions on the
implementation of transgenesis. Discarding the human body is less an ecstasy than a final
parting from one’s initial genetic patrimony. Is not the wish to end the castration imposed
by our genetic identity an acknowledgement of our species’ self-loathing, or the evidence
of our forgetfulness of the genetic mutations inflicted on the children of Chernobyl or
Hiroshima? The human body will become a genetic chimera when, like animals and
plants, humans have finally replaced the myth of Genesis and the Fall by that of transgen-
esis. In the 1946 second preface to his 1931 novel Brave New World, Aldovs Huxley
described this revolution in the following terms: ‘‘The truly revolutionary revolution will
take place, not in the outside world, but in the soul and flesh of human beings’’ (Huxley
1946, 12). Individual corporeal change is not enough anymore; a change of species would
be in order.
If the eighteenth century was the century of the transvestite, and the end of the nine-
teenth century that of the hermaphrodite, as Michel Foucault stated in 1980, we still need
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to find out what the theme of the chimera heralds in its pervasion of the beginning of the
twenty-first century. Under the conditions described by Foucault, the human chimera
would not leave the choice of his sex to the individual. It would be the logical consequence
of the ideological link instituted by biopower between sex and truth: Having a real sex
is not understood by the human chimera as the reduction of social sex to biological sex.
Truth reaches here its biological acme by merging both sexes into one, the couple incar-
nated into a sole genetic unit. Having become transgenic, humans will have no more
choice: Science will decide upon the validity of the body, health or economy once more
being used as alibis. By committing itself to transgenesis, transgenetic research has be-
come a French national priority, which comes down to asking Foucault’s initial question:
‘‘Do we really need a real sex?’’ (Foucault [1980] 1994, bk. IV, 116). The chimera may be
the last figure of a real sex, biotechnologically engineered as a whole, providing at last the
negation of castration through the demiurgic integrity of creation.
To Everyone Their Chimera
The body has become a sign of identity where it once was but a modality of social appear-
ance and surface (Le Breton 2002). Appearance is out, embodiment is in. The refusal of
dualism is not as much expressed by a wish to bid the natural body goodbye as by the
creation of a body of one’s own. Through a body of his own, the subject can model form,
but also matter itself: Marking the body is the first mode of this subjectification of the
body, and genetic manipulation offers the possibility of shaping a humanized matter.
Identity is building itself a cultural form through technological means. The cult of
the body not only develops freedom of the self, it has also become self-cultivation and
self-culture. If the capitalist system carries on maintaining subjectivity within the indefi-
nite dividuation of the body by renewing its commodification, the consumer is tempted to
consume himself in this circulation.
Within this mainstream liberal ideology, a body of one’s own is held as an individual
body in which we should only delight. Such consumerist hedonism satisfies the human
body up to the excesses of obesity and high-risk behaviors. Once the body has become it-
self, the individual can also subjectify it by personalizing it rather than withdrawing into
individualism. Corporal decoration fits into the pattern of expression when subjectification
attempts to incarnate the subject in the very matter of the body. Being is not an essence,
either exterior or transcendental to the subject. Sartre managed to reduce human essence as
a whole to existence: I am, I am but my actions. Existentialism was to find privileged
modes in feminism and worldly embodiment. The gender and the modes of their incarna-
tion drew every man and woman into an identity struggle for the acknowledgement of
corporeal existence. Being carnal consisted in directly incarnating one’s existence through
identity intensification as well as cultural exaltation. The cult of the body has been super-
seded by its culture and cultivation. The latter create their corporeal values in the subject’s
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very matter: his or her sex and sexuality, his or her actions, his or her genes or brain.
Liberation of the body has led to an intense yearning for the incarnation of a chimerical
body.
By using both biology and phenomenology, my notion of the incarnation of the
subject or that of the embodied mind is similar to Francisco Varela’s founding work. By
suggesting to start from the ‘‘lived body’’ to account for cognition, the notion of in-
carnation (or embodiment) no longer has the dualistic meaning of Christian tradition.
Spirit (the mind) is now present through the body that produces it. According to Varela,
a compromise should now be reached, studying cognition neither as the reconstitution
of a preordained exterior world (realism), nor as the projection of a preordained interior
world (idealism), but as embodied action: ‘‘By using the term embodied we mean to high-
light two points: first, that cognition depends upon the kinds of experience that come
from having a body with various sensorimotor capacities, and, second, that these indi-
vidual sensorimotor capacities are themselves embedded in a more encompassing biologi-
cal, psychological, and cultural context’’ (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch [1991] 1993,
234).
Let us find the link between biology and phenomenology that Maurice Merleau-Ponty
long looked for: enaction shows how cognitive structures emerge from the recurring sensor-
imotor schemes that guide action through perception. The phenobiotechnology of subjec-
tivity is not the new unified science, but an interknowledge: Everyone wants an incarnate
body.
A Phenobiotechnological Subject
The wish for a chimerical body is now only limited by biotechnological fantasy. Deciding
that a wholly bio-artificial body might not be compatible with bioethical norms and laws
would be to forget the biosubjectivity ensured by the progress of technological medicine.
The individual interest of one human being invoking his right to live in a dignified body
would legitimize research on artificial life. Supposing we could shape our bodies according
to our wishes: Would that be enough to abolish this object/subject relation, to embody the
subject fully? For the body, as a living subjectivity, is of such temporality and spatiality
that no content can ever reduce it. By changing his or her body and making it as close to
his or her wishes as possible, the biotechnological being would in effect change biological
time, not to stop or stretch it but to live our biological time intensely as a biosubjective
movement. By shaping the matter of his or her body, the subject not only forms him-
or herself, the subject also gets information about the movement of his or her flesh. By
changing the body, the subject finds itself to be moving. Rather than to construct him-
or herself in order to reach some functional or aesthetic ideal, the moving subject would
like, in the extreme, to modify him- or herself endlessly.
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Given that the body is no more natural, or at least that the individual and social repre-
sentation of the body defines it as entirely cultural and technical, we can deconstruct and
reconstruct the body endlessly. The body as a whole is already replaceable, like parts in a
biotechnological Meccano. Mechanization of the living must nonetheless be functional in
its artificiality, as in Jean-Luc Nancy’s 1999 text The Intruder about his transplant. Our
mental attachment to subjectivity maintains us in this imaginary unity of the self, of the
body proper that produces the illusion of mental independence from our biological state.
We all find out that our given body gets worn, falls ill, changes with age, and is degraded
by time. By changing the body, we could stop this biological temporality either by
slowing down the aging process, or by making up for the problems of time with a spatial
renewal of the body.
Conclusion
Through the creation of new species and within the human species, bioselected individuals
such as Baby Adam—born in 2000, genetically screened and selected to save his ill
sister—demonstrate that changing the body is now less virtual than feasible using bio-
technology. There remains for a specific alibi to be found. These changes not only
imply biological consequences, but also social ones. The changes in family relations, sexual
intercourse, and the relation to one’s body are now given legitimacy by the genomic
sciences.
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